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THE LOYAL MATCHMAKER DILEMMA: WHEN STAFFING FIRMS SHOULD
PAY FOR THE SINS OF THEIR CLIENT*
Matthew B. Seipel**
This Article recognizes the "loyal matchmaker" dilemma in
employment discrimination law. This dilemma exists when a staffing
firm complies with or otherwise acquiesces to its client's unlawful
discrimination against its temporary employee not because of that
employee's race, sex, national origin, disability, etc. Rather, it does so
because it sees itself as a loyal matchmaker to the client or because of
another lawful reason. In these situations, when should the staffing firm

be liable?
Employment discrimination law has failed to give a practical,
consistent, and flexible liability standard in this context. Generally,
courts hold the staffingfirm liable only if it is a joint employer with the
client and it had constructive knowledge of the discriminationandfailed
to take corrective action. Other potential liability standards include
forms of strict liability or no liabilitywhatsoeverfor its client's unlawful
discrimination.
Drawing from Professor Jeremias Prassl's work on a functional
conception of the employer, this Article proposes a liability standardto
apply here-the functional liability standard. This standard holds the
staffing firm strictly liable for its client's discrimination that directly
implicates one of the staffing firm's employer functions. A staffing
firm's employer functions may include paying wages, providing work,
controlling the internal work processes, and beginning and ending the
employment relationship. A staffingfirm can escape liability if it shows
that it reasonably accommodated the employee's harm. This standard
provides the flexibility, ease, consistency, andfairness lacking in other
potential liability standards. With this proposal, the Article expands
upon existing scholarship on employer responsibility, membership
causation, and theories of the employment relationship in U.S.
employment discriminationlaw.
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INTRODUCTION

Anthony is a carpenter by trade. Seeking employment, Anthony
contacts Workforce, a temporary staffing agency. He submits his
application to Workforce, which contains his employment history,
education, references, and other pertinent data. After a phone screening
and a skills test, Workforce brings Anthony in for an interview. The
interview was successful, and Workforce keeps Anthony's information
on file so he can be matched up to work at one of Workforce's carpentry
clients.'
Nails Corp., a high-end carpentry business that caters to wealthy
customers, called Workforce seeking a temporary carpenter. Workforce
immediately thinks of Anthony and calls to tell him the news. But after
an initial meeting with Nails, Nails tells Workforce that it wants
someone who is a good fit for the job-someone who is not too ethnic.
Anthony is Hispanic.
Workforce, although appalled by its client's discrimination, sees
itself as a loyal matchmaker for Nails Corp.2 It is not in the business of
judging its clients' unlawful practices. It complies with Nails not
because of Anthony's race, but rather it feels it has a duty to comply
with every client request. Anthony, suspecting that Nails may have
taken his race into account when deciding not to hire him, files charges
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
Generally, to succeed on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 Anthony must show that his employer
treated him less favorably than other employees similarly situated
because of his race.4 To qualify as an employer, an entity must exercise
considerable control over major aspects of a worker's terms, conditions,
wages, and privileges of employment.5
* The title is derived from a title of one of Professor O'Gorman's articles. See Daniel P. O'Gorman,
Payingfor the Sins of Their Clients: The EEOC's Position That Staffing Firms can be Liable When
Their Clients Terminate an Assigned Employee for a DiscriminatoryReason, 112 PENN ST. L. REV.

425 (2007).
** Class of 2017, UCLA School of Law; B.A. 2010, UCLA. I would like to thank Professor Noah
Zatz for his thoughtful oversight, guidance, and insight.
1.
See Meghan M. Sweeney, "We'd Love to Match Them, But...": How Temporary
Employment Agencies Understandand Use Race and Ethnicity, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 51, 59-60

(2011) (describing the typical hiring and placement process in place at staffing firms).
2. See id. at 73 (detailing a temporary staffing agency that catered to a carpentry client's
request for non-white workers because it saw itself as a loyal matchmaker).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
4. See Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 & n.15 (1977).
5. See Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Va. 1992); Donald
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Here, Nails Corp. rejected Anthony on the basis of his race. But, as
it happens, Nails fails to qualify as his employer under Title VII-Nails
does not determine Anthony's compensation or any major aspects of his
terms and conditions of employment. Nails left those determinations to
Workforce. Thus, Anthony cannot pursue a discrimination claim against
Nails.
While Workforce qualifies as his employer, Workforce
technically never took Anthony's race into account when it complied
with Nails' request. As discussed, Workforce complied because it is a
loyal matchmaker, and it complies with every client request-unlawful
and lawful. No employer harmed Anthony because of his race.
Anthony's situation-what I label the "loyal matchmaker"
dilemma-involves what Professor Noah Zatz refers to as external
membership causation: "when an employee suffers workplace harm
because of her disability (or sex, or race, and so on), even though her
employer never took her disability into account." 6 And it involves two
entities engaging in functions normally associated with employersbeginning and ending the employment relationship, paying wages,
providing work, or supervising work processes.
This Article explores situations similar to Anthony's, and it
proposes a solution to the following question: When should a court hold
a staffing firm liable for its client's discriminatory intent? 7
As discussed, this question involves external membership causation
with two employer-like entities. The question has left courts and
commentators struggling to find an appropriate liability standard to
apply.8 Some courts have combined negligence principles and joint
liability, finding the staffing firm liable for its end-user client's
discrimination only if: (1) the client and staffing firm are joint
employers; (2) the staffing firm had constructive knowledge of the
client's discriminatory intent; and (3) the staffing firm failed to take
corrective action.9 Such a standard would leave Anthony without relief

F. Kiesling, Jr., Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 8
(1997).
6.

Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the

-

DisaggregationofDiscriminatoryIntent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1361 (2009).
7. This Article does not specifically address situations where the client would be liable for
its staffing firm's unlawful discriminatory acts. Though, one could simply apply my proposal's
liability standard to the client as well. For a thoughtful comment on problems and issues involving
client liability for its staffing firm's discrimination, see Lara Samuels, "It's Not You, It's Me"
When are Client Companies Liablefor Staffing Firms' DiscriminatoryHiringPractices?, 3 AM. U.

Bus. L. REV. 339, 366-69 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2015).
9.

See, e.g., id. at 229; see also infra Part III.A.
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because Nails Corp. and Workforce fail to qualify as joint employers.
Some commentators have proposed strict joint employer liability.o
The staffing firm would be strictly liable for any discrimination that its
client commits against a temporary worker when both entities qualify as
joint employers." This would still leave Anthony without relief, and its
effect may be too harsh on the staffing firm. It would be unfair to hold
Workforce liable for every discriminatory act that Nails commits,
especially if such acts occur outside of the purview and control of
Workforce.
Finally, another possible liability regime might hold the staffing
firm only liable for its own disparate treatment, and not for any of its
client's discrimination. 12 In other words, the staffing firm is only liable
if it itself commits an employment-related harm with discriminatory
intent. But this gives staffing firms little incentive to protect their
temporary employees from potential, unscrupulous client practices.13
This Article proposes a sensible compromise: The staffing firm
should only be liable if the client's discriminatory act implicates one of
the staffing firm's employer functions.14 Employer functions include
paying wages, beginning and ending the employment relationship,
providing work, and controlling the internal processes of the workplace.
If a staffing firm shares control over an employer function with the
client, the staffing firm is still responsible for the client's
discrimination.15 But the staffing firm can escape liability through an
affirmative defense by showing that it reasonably accommodated the
harmed employee.16

For example, suppose that one of a staffing agency's functions is to
begin and end the worker's employment relationship with the client.
Suppose further that a staffing firm's client rejects an employee's
assignment because that employee is a woman. And the staffing firm
did not know and could not have known its client's discriminatory
reasons. Because the staffing agency engages in the function of
beginning that worker's employment relationship with the client, the
agency is the relevant employer and is thus strictly liable. The staffing

10.

See, e.g., Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status in TriangularEmployment Relationships,

42 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 727, 743 (2004); see also infra Part
11.

See infra Part ILI.B.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

.B.

II.C.
HI.C.
V.A.
V.A.
V.B.
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firm could escape liability if it shows that it immediately reassigned the
worker and paid that worker any backpay.
As should be clear, this proposal does away with a joint employer
requirement. Thus, under the hypothetical discussed above, Anthony
could get relief from the courts by pursuing a claim against both
Workforce and Nails because the rejection implicates its employer
function of ending the employment relationship.
Only a few scholars have focused their attention on when a staffing
firm should be liable for its client's discrimination. Professor O'Gorman
dedicates an article criticizing the EEOC's approach to solving the loyal
matchmaker dilemma.17 And Professor Jeremias Prass1 argues that the
law should adopt a functional conception of the employer.18
In
multilateral relationships-such as the relationship between the staffing
firm, client, and employee-Professor Jeremias Prassl argues that the
law should define the employer "through the exercise of a particular set
of functions .. ."19 But Prassl fails to meaningfully analyze the
theoretical appeal, disadvantages, and normative value of such a
conception as applied to U.S. antidiscrimination law. This paper fills the
gaps left open by Prassl and O'Gorman by proposing a modified version
of Prassl's functional conception of the employer and by analyzing its
applicability to the loyal matchmaker dilemma under U.S.
antidiscrimination law.
Within existing literature, this Article sits at the intersection
between Zatz's unifying theory of discrimination and Prassl's concept of
the employer. Zatz proposes a general theory of discrimination.20 A
claim of employment discrimination, Zatz argues, should be separated
into three elements: (1) employment-related harm, (2) membership
causation, and (3) a basis to hold an employer responsible for that
harm.2 1 Membership causation is separated into internal and external
membership causation.2 2 As discussed, external status causation exists
when an employee suffers harm because of her protected status by
something other than her employer. Internal status causation exists
17.

See generally, Daniel P. O'Gorman, Payingfor the Sins of Their Clients: The EEOC's

Position That Staffing Firms can be Liable When Their Clients Terminate an Assigned Employee for

a DiscriminatoryReason, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 425 (2007).
18.

JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER 1 (2015).

19.

Id.

20.

See Zatz, supra note 6, at 1412-15; see also Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the

Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REv. 1357, 1358 (2017) (expanding the unifying theory of
discrimination and focusing on disparate impact liability).
21.

Zatz, supra note 6, at 1413.

22.

Id. at 1412-15.
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when an employer makes an employment decision because of its
employee's protected status.23 The type of membership causation
generally determines the basis by which a court holds the employer
responsible for workplace harm.24
Prassl's concept of the employer disaggregates the employer into
employer functions and holds an entity responsible depending on
whether that entity is engaging in an employer function.2 5 The question
this Article seeks to answer involves both external causation and
employer responsibility in a multi-entity relationship involving employer
functions.
This Article's proposal expands upon Zatz's research by suggesting
that, in the staffing firm context and when external status causation
exists, employer functions should dictate employer responsibility. The
proposal thus also expands upon Professor Prassl's research on employer
functions and the concept of the employer.
The first purpose of this Article is descriptive. The rise of staffing
firms and decentralized employment has resulted in various problems in
applying current antidiscrimination law. One such problem is the loyal
matchmaker dilemma: when should the staffing firm be liable when it
complies with or otherwise acquiesces to a client's unlawful
discrimination for reasons other than race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, etc.?
The second purpose is normative. Courts and commentators have
failed to create a liability standard that considers the unique nature the
loyal matchmaker problem implicates. Instead, they have resorted to
negligence, which is too inconsistent and unpredictable, or they have
proposed an inflexible and, sometimes harsh, strict liability regime.26
Another proposal contends that the staffing firm should never be liable
for its client's "sins." 2 7 This Article argues that courts should adopt the
functional liability standard because it is more practical, flexible, and
consistent than the available alternatives. Further, it is fairer to both
employees and to the staffing firm.
Part I introduces the temporary staffing firm and the various
problems they raise for U.S. antidiscrimination law. It then introduces
the question I hope to resolve: when should the staffing firm be liable for
its client's discriminatory harm against a temporary employee? Part II
23.
24.

See id. at 1362.
See id.

25.
26.

See generally PRASSL, supra note 18.
See infra Part H1.

27.

See O'Gorman,supranote 17, at 425.
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analyzes two employer responsibility rules that courts use to find an
entity liable under antidiscrimination law: direct and vicarious liability.
With a solid grasp of direct and vicarious employer responsibility, I
detail three ways the law may solve our dilemma in Part III. I examine
the benefits and drawbacks to holding a staffing firm (1) liable only if
the firm is negligent to the client's discrimination when a joint employer
relationship exists; (2) strictly liable for its client's actions when a joint
employer relationship exists; and (3) liable only if the firm itself engages
in disparate treatment. I conclude that while all three have their appeal,
they lack flexibility, fairness, and, sometimes, clarity and predictability.
Part IV introduces my solution to the loyal matchmaker dilemma:
the functional liability standard. I argue that this standard brings the
appropriate amount of fairness, predictability, efficiency, clarity, and
flexibility to the dilemma. It applies strict liability where the staffing
agency is engaging in an employer function but gives the staffing firm a
chance to escape liability through an affirmative defense.
This
affirmative defense is satisfied where the staffing firm reasonably
accommodates the harmed employee. Where the staffing firm fails to
engage in an employer function implicated by its client's discrimination,
the staffing firm will not be liable.
I. THE RISE OF STAFFING FIRMs

The time has long passed when permanent, full-time jobs were the
norm.2 8 During that time, especially right after the Great Depression,
such stability was often required under collective bargaining contracts,
seniority provisions, and other agreements. 29 Employees tended to have
one, singular employer that exercised all the relevant employer functions
and all control over the employee.3 0 What has been called the "model of
career employment," employees advanced through one organization over
a long period, developing a loyalty to that firm."

28. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 529-39 (2001)
(discussing the rise of Taylorism and Fordism during the early 20th century that brought about the
encouragement of long-term firm loyalty through specific policies such as seniority packages,
promotion and retention plans, long-term benefit packages, etc.).
29. See Peter H. Cappelli & JR Keller, A Study of the Extent and Potential Causes of
Alternative Employment Arrangements, 66 ILR REV. J. WORK & POL'Y 874, 876 (2013).
30. See id.
31. Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and
Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 175-76
(2006).
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But over the past forty years, U.S. employers have dramatically
32
changed the way they engage with labor and the labor market. Enticed
by their flexibility and relative inexpensive cost, employers now are
more likely to use contingent workers through temporary staffing
firms.33 Use of staffing firms represents, more generally, the vertical
34
A
disintegration of the enterprise and the use of atypical workers.
to
employer-clients
its
with
staffing firm (or temp agency) contracts
35
supply temporary workers. The client usually pays the temp agency an
agreed upon amount for the temporary worker, and the temp agency
pays the worker a wage. 36 The client usually does the day-to-day of the
employee's work.3 ' And the staffing firm may move an employee from
one of its clients to another, often with no break in between
employment.3 8 One author notes that, in 1973, temporary workers
hovered at around 250,000 in the U.S. 3 9 By 1999, that number rose to
Another commentator states that staffing services
4.4 million. 40
employment more than doubled in the 1990s, reaching 3.8 million in
2000 from 1.4 million in 1989.41
The rise of staffing firms and contingent employees presents at least
two problems for the application of antidiscrimination law. The first
problem deals with how the law determines which entity is the relevant
32.

See, e.g., Erin Hatton,

Temporary Weapons: Employers' Use of Temps Against

Organized Labor, 67 ILR REV. J. WORK & POL'Y 86, 86-87 (2014); Cappelli & Keller, supra note
29, at 876; Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protectionsfor Atypical Employees: Employment Law for
Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.

251, 253 (2006); Leah F. Vosko, Legitimizing the TriangularEmployment Relationship:Emerging
InternationalLabour Standardsfrom a ComparativePerspective, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y 43,

43-44 (1997).
33.

See, e.g., Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Contingent Chicago: Restructuring the Spaces of

Temporary Labor, 25 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 471, 475 (2001) (discussing the rise in
temporary employment and the "explosive growth" of the temp industry); Shannon Smith, The
Rehabilitation Act and the Contingent Workforce: Effects of the Extension of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation to the Contingent Workforce, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 683, 684 (2013); Stone, supra

note 28, at 539-40 (discussing the "new psychological contract" in the employment setting);
Tarantolo, supra note 31, at 175.
34.

PRASSL, supra note 18, at 3.

35.

See Katherine Hannan Wears & Sandra L. Fisher, Who is an Employer in the Triangular

Employment Relationship? Sorting Through the Definitional Confusion, 24 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J.

159, 159 (2012).
36.

See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB.

L.J. 503, 511 (1997).
37. See Stone, supra note 28, at 623; Wears & Fisher, supra note 35, at 160.
38.

See Summers, supra note 36, at 511.

39.
40.

Peck & Theodore, supra note 33, at 475.
Id.

41.

Matthew Dey, Susan N. Houseman & Anne E. Polivka, Manufacturers'Outsourcing to

Staffing Services, 65 ILR REV.: J. WORK & POL'Y 533, 535-36 (2012).
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employer. Is the employer the staffing firm or the client, or both? 42
Under Title VII, the Magnuson court set out two tests that both must be
satisfied before the entity is considered an employee's employer: (1)
definition test, and (2) control test.4 3 To satisfy the definition test, the
entity must fall within the scope of Title VII's definition of
"employer."4 To meet Title VII's definition, the entity must both be
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and employ "fifteen or
more employees."
And the control test is satisfied if the entity
exercises "substantial control over significant aspects of the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiffs
employment.'
For example, imagine a client that relinquishes its responsibility of
hiring certain employees and gives that responsibility to a staffing firm.
The staffing firm finds employees, interviews them, and then assigns
them to the client without significant input from the client. Assuming
that is all the staffing firm does in its relationship with the temporary
employees, it is unclear whether it would satisfy the control test above.
The firm would not control the day-to-day activities of the worker,
including what the worker wears, how the worker works, etc. Thus, the
worker may not be able to sue the staffing firm as her "employer."
But it seems that this problem may not be as significant as it might
appear for a worker-at least under Title VII. Guidance by the EEOC
states that the staffing firm and the client will generally qualify as a temp
worker's employer.47 This is so because both entities tend to exercise
the requisite amount of control over the worker. 48 The guidance
describes the relationship between the standard staffing firm and the
42. For a general discussion and overview of U.S. work law statutes and their definitions of
employee and employer, see Wears & Fisher, supra note 35, at 160.
43. Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Va. 1992); see Parker
v. Golden Peanut, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708 (E.D. Va. 2015); Lee v. Mobile Cty. Comm'n,
954 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (S.D. Ala. 1995), affd, 103 F.3d 148 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Jason E.
Pirruccello, Contingent Worker Protection from Client Company Discrimination: Statutory
Coverage, Gaps, and the Role of the Common Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191, 198-99 (2005); cf Butler

v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408-10 (4th Cir. 2015). Note that the Magnuson
court did not use the terms "definition test" and "control test." I use these terms for simplicity's
sake.

44.
45.
46.

Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 507.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 507; see also Kiesling, Jr., supra note 5, at 8 (discussing the

manner of control exercised).
47. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC NOTICE 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS 3 (1997) [hereinafter EEOC NOTICE].

48.

See id. at 6.
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employee as the following:
[T]he [staffing] firm typically hires the worker, determines
when and where the worker should report to work, pays the
wages, is itself in business, withholds taxes and social security,
provides workers' compensation coverage, and has the right to
discharge the worker. The worker generally receives wages by
the hour or week rather than by the job and often has a
continuing relationship with the staffing firm. Furthermore,
the intent of the parties typically is to establish an employeremployee relationship.49
The guidance then notes that the client will usually qualify as an
employer because the client tends to "exercise[] significant supervisory
control over the worker."5 0

And even if a staffing firm or client fails to qualify as an
employee's employer, Title VII allows an employee, in some
circumstances, to sue an entity even if that entity does not qualify as the
aggrieved employee's "employer." 5 1 For example, an employee may
claim that the entity discriminatorily interfered with that employee's
employment relationship with another entity. 52 In Sibley Memorial
Hospital v. Wilson, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether a nurse, Verne
Wilson, could have standing to sue the Sibley Memorial Hospital, an
entity with which Wilson did not have an employment relationship.5 3
The court held that Sibley's liability under Title VII could be based on
its interference with Wilson's employment relationship with his
patients.54 In other words, Sibley could be liable because it blocked
Wilson's access to new employers even though Sibley itself was not
Wilson's employer.
The court based this decision on Title VII's policy and text. It first
stated that Title VII's goal was "to achieve equality of employment

49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. In some circumstances, courts have found that clients do not qualify as the
employee's employer. See Dunn v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (M.D. La. 2001)
(finding that client was not employee's employer under Title VII where employee was subject to
client's policies, but temp agency paid employee and could reassign employee at any time, and
Uniroyal failed to enter into an employment contract with employee).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Pirruccello,supra note 43, at 200-01.
See id. at 200.
Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1339-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1342.
Id at 1342-43.
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opportunities."S 6 It then noted that Title VII bans labor organizations,
employment agencies, and employers "from exerting any power it may
have to foreclose, on indivious [sic] grounds, access by any individual to
employment opportunities otherwise available to him.", 7 And that it
makes little sense to allow an entity to discriminatorily restrict an
individual's employment with another employer, when that entity could
not do the same with its own employees. To allow such interference
"would be to condone continued use of the very criteria for employment
that Congress has prohibited.", 8 The court further noted that Title VII
specifically refers to "person aggrieved," indicating that persons other
than the offending employer's employees have sufficient standing.5 9
The second problem presented by the staffing firm-client-employee
relationship deals with when a staffing firm should be held responsible
for its end-user client's harmful, discriminatory intent. For example,
imagine that Regina, a black woman, is employed by the staffing firm
Workforce. Workforce seeks to assign Regina to one of its clients, ABC
Company. ABC rejects Regina's assignment, stating that it does not
want black women at its workplace. Workforce is appalled by the
client's blatant sexism and discrimination. But, instead of somehow
correcting this awful situation, Workforce accepts the ABC's reasoning
and keeps ABC as a client and a business partner. Workforce merely
seeks to be its client's loyal matchmaker. Should Workforce be liable
for ABC's discrimination?
On the one hand, Workforce never engaged in disparate treatment
itself-it never harmed Regina because she is black. Thus, Workforce
may not have breached any duty it owed to Regina as Regina's
employer. But, Workforce failed to affirmatively reject its client's
discrimination. In fact, Workforce made the decision to keep ABC as a
client knowing that ABC engaged in unlawful discrimination.
The focus of this Article is on this problem, and my core argument
is that the functional approach can help resolve this problem by
providing a clear conceptual framework to sort out when the staffing
firm should be liable. The way the law can currently tackle this dilemma
is inflexible, unclear, and unpredictable. But before we reach that
framework, we should parse out the situational context in which this
problem arises, namely, the types of employer responsibility standards
56.
(1969)).
57.
58.
59.

Id at 1340-41 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
Id. at 1341.

Id
Id
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the problem implicates: vicarious and direct liability.
II. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES

This part details two employer responsibility doctrines the courts
have used to hold an employer responsible for employment-related
harm-vicarious liability and direct liability. Under vicarious liability,
an employer is liable for an employee's harm regardless of whether it
breached a duty to that employee. Direct liability requires some sort of
negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the employer. As I will discuss
in Part IV, vicarious liability principles work to justify this Article's
proposal, thus a discussion of them is appropriate. Ultimately, however,
this paper's proposal should be viewed through a direct liability lens.60
A.

Vicarious Employer Responsibility

Professor Alan Sykes defines vicarious liability as "the imposition
of liability upon one party for a wrong committed by another party." 61
Professor Fleming James, Jr. further describes vicarious liability as a
situation where "A is held liable to C for damages which B's negligence
has caused C, even though A has been free from negligence or other
fault." 6 2 The nature of B's tort or wrong need not be an act of
negligence-it can be based on strict liability, intent, etc.63
Scholars have recognized at least four justifications to impose
vicarious liability on an actor. The first justification is control.' The
level of control A has over B justifies imposing vicarious liability. 65 The
reasoning is twofold. First, where A exercises control over B, it is
inherently A's fault that B committed a wrongful act.66 Second, because
of A's control, A is in a better position to prevent B's wrongful
conduct.6 7
60.

See infra Part IV.C.

61.

Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the

Scope ofEmployment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 (1988).
62. Fleming James, Jr., VicariousLiability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161,161 (1954).
63. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day's Work: Employers' Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 517, 540 (2002).
64. See id at 535-36.
65.

James, Jr., supra note 62, at 165; see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental

Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1739, 1754 (1996) ("Indeed, under the
common law the factor of the employer's 'control' plays a major role in defining the extent of the
employer's vicarious liability."); see also Dalley, supra note 63, at 535-36.
66. See Dalley, supra note 63, at 536.
67. See id. at 536-37.
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A second justification for vicarious liability is what Dalley terms
the "risks-and-benefits-of-the-businesstheory."" Under this theory, the
policy behind vicarious liability "is to coordinate the burdens and
benefits of a business."6 9 In the case of the employment relationship,
vicarious liability is justified because, at the time that employee
committed a wrongful act, the employer was profiting from the
employee.7 0 James articulates an iteration of this theory noting that the
business creates risks and is deployed to create profit or to benefit the
employer in some way, thereby making the employer responsible for any
consequences that may arise.n
Again, in the employment
A third justification is choice.
relationship context, a decision-maker finds vicarious liability because
of "the master's power to choose and discharge his servants."72 As
But it could
James notes, this relates back to the controljustification.
also relate to how the employer holds its employee out to the world. For
example, because an employer has chosen a particular employee, that
employer trusts that employee and asks others to do the same.74 In a
way, the employer is telling others to rely on its choice of employee, and
the employer should therefore be vicariously liable when others are
harmed because of that reliance.7 5
The fourth justification is causation. Professor Sykes, making an
economic efficiency argument, justifies vicarious liability when an
enterprise "fully causes" the wrongful act in question.76 In other words,
the stronger the causal relationship between the enterprise and the
wrongful act, the more likely that a decision-maker should impose
Sykes notes that holding the
vicarious liability on the enterprise. 7
employer vicariously liable for its supervisor's harassment is justified
under his causation theory because "[a]bsent the existence of a
supervisor-subordinate relationship, the supervisor would have no
leverage over the subordinate, and the likelihood of sexual harassment

68. Id (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 538.
70. Id.
71. James, Jr., supra note 62, at 169 (quoting and referencing Lord Brougham's statement in
Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & F. 894, 910 (H.L. 1838)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Sykes, supra note 61, at 571-76 ("An enterprise 'fully causes' the wrong of an employee
if the dissolution of the enterprise ... would reduce the probability of the wrong to zero.").
77. See id. at 606-07.
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would be significantly reduced." 7 8 Conversely, when a non-supervisory
employee commits harassment, Sykes finds that the causal relation to the
employer is not strong enough to warrant vicarious liability.79 Thus,
Sykes notes that this employment relationship, at best, only somewhat
affects the likelihood that a non-supervisory employee will harass a coworker because such employees "have no leverage to exert over the
individual who is the object of harassment, and individuals prone to
commit acts of harassment in the absence of any leverage may well do
so irrespective of their occupation, position, employment, or
unemployment." 80
Under current Title VII jurisprudence, an employer may be
vicariously liable for its supervisor's discriminatory actions, and
Suppose, for
generally not for its non-supervisory employees.8 1
example, a mid-level manager commits a "tangible" discriminatory act,
such as terminating an employee because of that employee's race. An
employer could be vicariously liable for that manager's act even though
it did not know about the act and it officially prohibited such
discrimination.82
In the harassment context, where a supervisor fails to commit a
tangible employment act, the Supreme Court has found that a
supervisor's harassment is not within the scope of employment. 83 Yet,
the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable in such a situation
because the employment relationship gives the supervisor the leverage
and assistance to commit the acts.84 But the employer can escape
vicarious liability if it proves that it took reasonable care to avoid and
correct the harassment and that the plaintiff did not take advantage of
ways to fix the issue." This affirmative defense, known as the
78. Id.
79. Id. at 607-08. Sykes terms "vicarious liability based on negligence" as the proper
liability standard to be applied in this situation. Id. at 578. Note that although he uses the words
"vicarious liability," what he is actually referring to is direct liability. See Dalley, supra note 63, at
528.
80. Sykes, supra note 61, at 608.
81. EEOC regulations hold an employer directly liable for low-level employees'
discriminatory harassment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
82. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
83. Id. at 793-94; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998); see also Zatz,
supranote 6, at 1380-81.

84. See Faragher,524 U.S. at 802-03; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-64.
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F. 3d 323, 329 (3d Cir. 2015);
E.E.O.C. v. Bob Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 463-66 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that employer was
vicariously liable for its manager's discriminatory harassment where employer did not have a

specific sexual harassment policy; employer's nondiscrimination policy unknown to employees;
policy failed to tell employees how to file harassment complaints; employer failed to train its
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Faragher/Ellerthdefense, is not available to an employer where the
harasser is a high-ranking official in the company, such as the
president.
The Supreme Court justified the Faragher/Ellerthdefense
as essential to fulfilling the policy of Title VII to discourage harassment,
and to increase employers' use of antiharassment policies and grievance
mechanisms.
The joint employer liability standard under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") holds employers strictly liable for their joint
employer's unlawful acts.88 Department of Labor regulations state that
"all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for
compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the [FLSA] .... 89
One article noted that "[t]his is a basic and significant distinction
between the FLSA and Title VII." 90
There is some indication that courts view this standard as a type of
vicarious liability. For example, the court in Thompson v. Real Estate
Mortgage Network distinguished this type of liability from direct
liability, writing: "Under these circumstances, each joint employer may
be held jointly and severally liable for the FLSA violations of the other,
in addition to direct liability for its own violations." 91
B. DirectEmployer Responsibility
In certain circumstances, an employer is directly liable rather than
vicariously liable. In contrast to vicarious liability where liability is not
based on fault, "an employer is directly liable when its own act or
omission causally contributed to tortious conduct." 9 2 For example, an
employer may be directly liable when it adopts or ratifies an employee's
supervisors on harassment complaint procedures; and employer failed to discipline harasser).
86. See Wells v. Hi Country Auto Grp., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265 (D.N.M. 2013) (noting
that the Faragher/Ellerthdefense is unavailable where the harasser was the company's president
and/or owner).

87.
88.
89.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014).
29 C.F.R. §.791.2(a) (2000).

90.
Steven A. Carvell & David Sherwyn, It Is Time for Something New: A 21st Century
Joint-EmployerDoctrinefor 21st Century Franchising,5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 5, 16 (2015).

91.

Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148. However, one could view this as a form of direct liability as

well. For example, suppose that where a joint employer relationship exists, those employers have a
heightened duty to ensure that their employees are receiving FLSA mandated overtime or wages.

Thus, when employer A fails to follow the FLSA, employer B has breached its duty to the
employee-even when employer B has no constructive knowledge of the FLSA violation.
92. Katherine Philippakis, Comment, When Employers Should be Liable for Supervisory
Personnel:Applying Agency Principlesto Hostile-Environment Sexual HarassmentCases, 28 ARIZ.

ST. L.J. 1275, 1280 (1996).
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unlawful act,9 3 or when it tells an employee to commit a tort.94 Put
simply, an employer is directly liable for its own negligence or for its
breach of a duty to its employee. 95
Title VII cases follow this negligence standard when dealing with
third parties or non-supervisory employees, finding the employer
directly liable when it unreasonably fails to shield its employees from
discrimination originating from these actors. For example, in the
Seventh Circuit decision Dunn v. Washington County Hospital, an
independent contractor of the employer, Dr. Coy, "made life miserable"
for the plaintiff because of her sex.9 6 The district court below found that
the employer hospital was not liable for Dr. Coy's discriminatory acts
because the hospital could not be held vicariously liable for Coy's acts. 97
But the Seventh Circuit noted that "liability under Title VII is direct
rather than derivative."" Thus, "[t]he employer's responsibility is to
provide its employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions. The
genesis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the employer
handles the problem." 99 The Seventh Circuit then found that the plaintiff
stated a claim of sex discrimination because the plaintiff alleged that the
hospital knew of Coy's discriminatory acts and failed to remedy the
situation.100
Commentators have recognized that other third-party harasser cases
similar to Dunn apply a direct liability standard rather than a vicarious
liability standard. 10 ' Besides the third-party harasser scenario, direct
liability rears its head in co-worker harassment as well.102 Further,

93. See Dalley, supra note 63, at 528; see also Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL
339, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973), af'd andremanded, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding
employer liable for supervisor's discriminatory job order in part because employer's top
management ratified the order).

94. Dalley, supranote 63, at 528.
95. See id.
96. Dunn v. Wash. Cty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 2005).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 691.
99. Id.
100. Id at 692-93.
101. See Zatz, supra note 6, at 1380-82 ("Third-party harasser cases, however, cannot be
governed by the agency principles applicable to supervisors. By definition, the harasser is not the
employer's agent. Recognizing this point, courts rest employer responsibility on negligence
principles, not vicarious liability for intentional discrimination.").
102. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2012)
(noting that an employer is not vicariously liable for its non-supervisory employees' harassment,
and instead is held to a negligence plus corrective action standard); Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt
Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir. 2010) ("DMB cannot be vicariously liable for sexual
harassment by non-supervisory coworkers.... But DMB may be directly liable for its employees'
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courts hold labor unions directly rather than vicariously liable for an
employer's discriminatory actions against that employer's employees.
For example, the Romero court noted that the union must take steps to
remedy an employer's discrimination: "[W]e point out that labor
organizations have an affirmative duty to insure compliance with Title
VI."103

Later cases, drawing from Romero, developed the deliberate
acquiescence theory. A union is liable under this theory where (1) the
employer discriminates against an employee, and (2) the union
deliberately or purposely acquiesces in the discrimination.
The court
in Greenier found the union liable where it "cooperated with, facilitated
and condoned" the employer's discrimination under this doctrine."os
The court said that the employee established the second prong because
the union refused to remedy a discriminatory termination, and instead
cooperated with the employer with the termination.10 6 It is unclear under
this theory if the employee can establish the second prong by merely
showing that the union was negligent to discrimination and failed to take
corrective action. The words "deliberately" and "purposely" hint that
the union must have actual knowledge.10 7 Nonetheless, direct liability
standards are at play because the court focuses on the labor union's
actions or omissions, and such focus is in line with direct liability
principles.108

Where two employers exercise sufficient control over an employee
to establish a joint employer relationship, courts hold employers directly

actions that violate Title VII if the company 'knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it
can show that it took immediate action and appropriate corrective action."' (citations omitted));
Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Where the perpetrator
of the harassment is merely a co-employee of the victim, the employer will be held directly liable if
it knew or should have known of the harassing conduct but failed to take prompt remedial action.").
See also Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV.
1169, 1193 (2017) (noting that employer negligence is required in both co-worker and nonemployee harassment claims).
103. Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 1980).
104. See Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188,201 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182 (D. Me. 2002).
105. Id.
106. See id at 182-84.
107. See id at 182; see also York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that
"mere inaction" by a union does not constitute acquiescence but rather, proof of the union's
"requisite knowledge" is required).
108. For more information on Romero and similar doctrines, see Marion Crain & Ken
Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1767, 1836-46 (2001) (summarizing existing
jurisprudence on unions' antidiscrimination requirements and arguing that the law should place an
affirmative duty on unions to promote a discrimination-free workplace).
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liable for the discriminatory acts of their joint employer. 109 In EEOC v.
Sage Realty Corp.," 0 the court found a building management company
liable for its joint employer's actions where the joint employer required
the employee to wear a sexually provocative outfit that subjected her to
sexual harassment."' After noting the joint employer relationship, the
court stated, "[m]ore importantly, there was no evidence adduced at trial
(other than Palumbo's self-serving statement to Hasselman on June 7,
1976) that Monahan Building was powerless to remedy the situation
created by Hasselman's ill-fitting uniform."'1 2 It then stressed that, at
the very least, the building management company had constructive
knowledge of the harassment related to the outfit.113 Thus, the court
found the building management company liable essentially because it
knew or should have known about the discrimination and failed to take
corrective action." 4 In other words, it held the company directly liable
for its own negligent actions with respect to its employee, and not
vicariously liable.' 15
Decided under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. articulates a similar direct
liability regime for a temp agency and end-user client that are joint
employers.' 1 6 The court found that the agency's client requested an
7
employee's termination because of her disability under the ADA."' The
court also decided whether the staffing agency could be held liable for
its client's discriminatory request."' The agency argued that it could not
be liable because it did not make the decision to terminate the
employee-its client did.1 9 In the agency's brief, it urged the court to

109. See, e.g., Torres-Negr6n v. Merck & Co., 488 F.3d 34, 40-41 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A]
finding that two companies are an employee's 'joint employers' only affects each employer's
liability to the employee for their own actions, not for each other's actions. . . ." (citing Virgo v.
Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1359-63 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Whitaker v. Milwaukee
Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Some of our sister circuits have held explicitly that
establishing a 'joint employer' relationship does not create liability in the co-employer for actions
taken by the other employer.... We have no reason to depart from the course set by the other
circuits. . . .").

110.
(S.D.N.Y.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.), amended by 521 F. Supp. 263
1981).
See id. at 612-13.
Id.
See id. at 613.
See id.
See id. at 612-13.
Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
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find liability only if the agency was "instrumental in making the final
decision to terminate" the employee's assignment.1 2 0
The court did not accept that argument. 12 1 Instead, the court
applied a standard it interpreted from the EEOC Guidance. 12 2 The court
articulated their rule as the following: "A staffing agency is liable for the
discriminatory conduct of its joint-employer client [(1)] if it participates
in the discrimination, or [(2)] if it knows or should have known of the
client's discrimination but fails to take corrective measures within its
control." 12 3 In finding the agency liable, the court noted several
determinative facts. First, agency personnel carried out the termination
of the assignment even though it doubted the legality of its client's
request.1 24 Second, it did not matter that the agency was legally bound
to comply with the client's request. The court held that it was not a
defense. Plus, the contract expressly required that the agency follow the
ADA.1

25

Other courts follow this negligence plus corrective action standard,
holding the temp agency directly liable where there exists a joint
employer relationship. 126 In Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co., the
employee failed to establish Title VII liability against a staffing agency
for the client's failure to put the employee in a full-time position.1 27 The
court noted that the employee never told the agency about the client's
discriminatory actions and the agency had no reason to know because
the agency was effectively just a payroll service.1 2 8 The court in
Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp. also followed the same standard,
finding an agency not liable for its client's actions because the
employees did not give enough notice to the agency of the
discrimination.1 29
. 120. Response Brief of Defendant-Appellees Manpower of Texas, L.P.; Manpower, Inc.; and
Transpersonnel, Inc. at 46, Burton, 798 F.3d 222 (No. 14-50944), 2014 WL 10537282.
121. Burton, 198 F.3d at 228-29. The court specifically rejected the staffing agency's
argument that a court can only hold a staffing agency liable for a client's discriminatory decision
when the staffing agency was instrumental in making the decision. Id. at 229 n.5. The staffing firm
cited Vance v. Union Planters Corp. in support of its "instrumental" liability standard. Id. (citing

Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 279 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002)). The court wrote: "[wie have already
observed that Vance dealt only with . . whether a given defendant is an employer under the ADA.
We again reject the invitation to misread Vance. . . ." Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id at 228-29.
Id at 229.
Id
Id
Id. at 228.
Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co., 988 F. Supp. 925, 937 (D.S.C. 1997).
Id. at 938.
Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., 966 F. Supp. 33, 46 (D.D.C. 1997).
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III. THREE POTENTIAL EMPLOYER RESPONSIBLITY REGIMES

With knowledge of vicarious and direct employer responsibility, we
can then apply versions of these standards to our problem. As a
reminder, the loyal matchmaker dilemma is the following: when should
the staffing firm be liable when it complies, consents, or otherwise
acquiesces to a client's discrimination for reasons other than race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, etc.?
Consider the following three hypotheticals:
(1) Regina is employed by Workforce. Workforce contracted with
Hotel, Inc. to supply Hotel temporary housekeepers during the busy
holiday season. Workforce seeks to place Regina with one of its clients,
a hotel managed by Hotel, Inc. Hotel tells Workforce that it does not
want Regina, a black woman, because she lacks the relevant
qualifications. In secret though, Hotel does not want Regina because she
is black and thinks that black women are not appropriate for their
clientele. Workforce complies with Hotel's request and retains Hotel as
a client. Should Workforce be liable for Hotel's race discrimination?
(2) Suppose that Hotel accepts Regina's placement. Regina is
tasked with cleaning the guest rooms and other areas of Hotel's property.
Workforce has no say, legally or practically, in how Hotel controls
Regina at its property. Throughout her assignment, one of Hotel's
supervisors, John, singles Regina out because Regina is black. John
constantly refers to Regina using racial stereotypes and offensive slurs,
causing Regina to dread coming to work every day. Regina complains
to both Workforce management and management at Hotel. Neither
Hotel nor Workforce take any corrective action. For example, Hotel
does not discipline John nor conduct any kind of investigation.
Similarly, Workforce fails to speak with Hotel about the situation and
does not offer Regina a placement with another client. Is Workforce
liable for Hotel's harassment?
(3) One day, John orders Regina to clean the men's restroom in the
hotel's main lobby, a restroom that is not Regina normally part of her

articulated the rule: "To prevail on a theory of joint employer liability, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and that it failed to take those
corrective measures within its control." Id.
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duties to clean. When Regina asks John why he is choosing her to clean
the restroom, John replies, "because you black people are the best at
cleaning restrooms. And you're the only one working today." When
Regina refuses to clean the restroom, John tells her, "you clean the
restroom or I'll have you fired!" Regina refuses again and leaves to do
her other duties for the day. John relays to high-level Hotel management
the discriminatory statements he told Regina, and Hotel explicitly
approves of the statements, telling John, "Regina will be out of here by
tomorrow. She should know her place." Later that day, Hotel informs
Workforce that Regina cannot return to her assignment because she
disobeyed a direct order. Workforce investigated Regina's dismissal by
interviewing Regina and John. Neither John nor Regina told Workforce
about John's discriminatory comments and bias.
Workforce
immediately reassigned Regina to a new client. Is Workforce liable for
the discriminatory termination?
In this section, I will analyze the merits of three possible employer
responsibility regimes for the staffing agency that we might apply to the
three hypotheticals: (1) liability based on the staffing firm's negligence
and a joint employer relationship,130 (2) strict liability when a joint
employer relationship exists,13 1 and (3) liability only if the staffing firm
engages in disparate treatment. 1 32
I will discuss these regimes'
disadvantages, theoretical appeal, and whether they are consistent with
current law.
A. Liability Based on Negligence and a Joint Employer Relationship
Out of the three incidents in our hypo involving Reginadiscriminatory assignment, workplace harassment, and discriminatory
termination-when would Workforce be liable under a negligence
liability plus joint employer regime? Recall that negligence liability is a
form of direct liability-where the employer has breached some duty
owed to the employee. 133 A negligence liability standard would hold
Workforce liable when it knew or should have known that Hotel was
discriminating against Regina and failed to take corrective action. In
other words, Workforce would be liable for harm inflicted by Workforce
through its own negligent act or omission, but caused by Hotel's
130.

See discussion infra Section h.A.

131.
132.
133.

See discussion infra Section IB.
See discussion infra Section HI.C.
See discussion infra Section HI.A.2.
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discriminatory intent. 134 As discussed in the previous section, several
courts hold staffing firms to this standard. 1 35 And a similar standard is
applied in the third-party harassment and co-worker harassment
context.1 3 6 The EEOC Guidance applies this standard to discrimination
that occurs at the client's workplace. 13 7 At the work site, the Guidance
states that a temp agency is liable if it: (1) participates in work site
discrimination, or (2) if it knows or should know about discrimination
and did not take corrective measures." 8
1. Regina's DiscriminatoryAssignment
Workforce would likely escape liability when it assigned Regina to
Hotel. Workforce had no reason to suspect that Hotel was refusing
In fact, Hotel engaged in this
Regina because she was black.
from Workforce. Because it
it
hidden
to
keep
secret
in
discrimination
did not know and should not have known about Hotel's assignment bias
for women, Workforce would not be liable.
Finding that Workforce is not liable here presents a problem
though. The Workforce's raison d'etre is finding temporary workers
and assigning them to its clients. When discrimination occurs during the
temp agency's primary business function, should it not be held to a
higher standard than mere negligence? Antidiscrimination law does, in
certain contexts, consider the employer's primary function when
determining whether to hold that employer liable.13 9 Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") allow certain
employer discrimination where such discrimination is essential to
preserve the employer's primary business function. 14 0 This defense,
called the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"), requires an
inquiry into the employer's primary business function.141 The Supreme
Court calls this inquiry the "essence of the business test."l 42
For example, the court in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines addressed

134.

See O'Gorman,supra note 17, at 439.

135.
136.
137.

See cases cited supra note 102.
O'Gorman, supra note 17, at 434.
See EEOC NOTICE, supra note 47, at 14.

138.

See id.

139.

See Katie Manley, Note, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII's Concession to Gender

Discrimination, 16 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 169, 169 (2009).
140. Title VII allows the BFOQ defense where discrimination involves national origin,
religion, and gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
141. See Manley, supra note 139, at 169.
142. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991).
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whether defendant Southwest Airlines' policy of hiring only females for
its flight attendants and ticket agents satisfied the BFOQ defense.1 4 3
Defendant argued that its hiring of only females for these positions went
toward the brand and image that defendant worked hard to advertise to
its customers, and fulfilled "its public promise to take passengers
skyward with 'love."' 1" Without its female-only policy, defendant
emphasized, its future financial success would be in serious jeopardy.' 4 5
The court rejected Southwest's argument, proclaiming, "[1]ike any other
airline, Southwest's primary function is to transport passengers safely
and quickly from one point to another."1 46 Thus, any "sex-linked job
function" has only an incidental consequence on Southwest's primary
business function. Because of this, the court rejected Southwest's
BFOQ defense.1 4 7
Where antidiscrimination law considers an employer's primary
business function as part of an affirmative defense, maybe the law
should also consider it in multilateral employment relationships when
determining how to distribute liability. In other words, if the law allows
an employer to use its primary function as a shield, why not allow
employees to use it as a sword in some circumstances?
2. Regina's Workplace Harassment
Moving to the next incident-the workplace harassmentWorkforce would likely be liable under a negligence liability
standard.1 4 8 First, Workforce had notice of Hotel's discriminatory acts
because Regina informed Workforce of the acts. Second, Workforce
failed to engage in corrective action-it did not investigate Regina's
accusations and it did not immediately reassign Regina to a new client.
Thus, Workforce would be liable for its own negligence assuming, of
course, that Workforce and Hotel are joint employers.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302-04 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 302.

147.

For more information on the BFOQ defense and the "essence of the business" test, see

Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RuTGERS L. REv. 921,
930-39 (1993); Manley, supra note 139, at 174 (summarizing the BFOQ defense, its history, and
issues and problems that have been raised regarding its application); Rachel L. Cantor, Consumer
Preferencesfor Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ

Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493, 493 (1999) (discussing different cases analyzing employers'
BFOQ defense and arguing that courts should engage in a market definition inquiry to determine the
"essence of the business").

148.

Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001).
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As previously
But is negligence liability appropriate here?
this standard
of
discussed, the EEOC Guidance specifically approves
149
And
when the client's discrimination occurs at the client's workplace.
third-party harassment cases, similar in structure to the agency-client150 But a key difference is that
employee relationship, use this standard.
the employer in third-party harassment cases tends to control the
151
Judge Easterbrook in
workplace where the harassment is occurring.
harassment case
third-party
a
Hospital,
County
Washington
v.
Dunn
occurring
harassment
the
discussed above, speaks to the importance of
152
Citing the Second Restatement of
on employer-owned premises.
Agency with approval, Easterbrook writes that "a person 'can be subject
to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or
reckless in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious
conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises
3
Shortly before that,
or with instrumentalities under his control.' 15
for protecting its
responsible
is
employer
the
that
Easterbrook indicates
54
The
premises."l
"its
from
employees by keeping harassers away
staffmg firm is unlikely to control or own the client's premises or
instrumentalities.
Another key difference is that the temp agency and the client are
employers of the temp worker, while certain third-party harassment
cases tend to involve an actor that engages in no employer functions
over the employee."5 5 These two key differences may hint that a
different kind of standard is needed here-a standard that is flexible
enough to consider both whether the temp agency engages in a relevant
employer function and whether that function involves the control over
The functional liability
the client's premises or instrumentalities.
both.
considers
part
next
the
in
standard that I propose
Further, the negligence liability standard may impose an undue
financial burden on the staffing firm:

149.

See EEOC NOTICE, supra note 47, at 14.

150.
151.

See cases cited supra note 102.
Some third-party harassment cases hold the employer to a direct negligence liability

standard when the harassment occurs at another entity's workplace.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Cromer

Food Servs, Inc., 414 F. App'x 602, 607-08 (4th Cir. 2011) (showing an employee harassed by a
hospital's employees at the hospital's premises).
152. Dunn v. Wash. Cty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005).
153. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(d) (1958)).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Dunn, 429 F.3d at 690 (holding that a third party was employer's independent
contractor and not aggrieved employee's employer); see also Erickson v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 469
F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding a third party was an inmate housed on employer's premises).
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When a staffing firm is neither aware of a client's
discrimination nor should be aware of it, the firm cannot take
any corrective measures. If, however, there is a disputed issue
of fact as to whether the firm knew or should have known of
the discrimination, the firm will not obtain summary judgment
and will have to defend the case through trial. Even if the jury
finds that the firm neither knew nor should have known of the
client's discrimination, the cost of defending the case through
trial will make the win Pyrrhic. Also, the risk of an adverse
jury finding regarding the firm's actual or constructive
knowledge of the client's discrimination will cause many
staffing firms to settle prior to trial. Thus, the corrective action
standard, while appearing to impose a minimal and reasonable
burden on staffing firms, may have a substantial financial
impact on them."s'
Though this argument is directed toward the negligence liability
standard more generally, the argument's force may be the strongest
when focused on client discrimination at the client's workplace.
Suppose that Workforce got conflicting reports about Regina's
discrimination. Hotel's management says that John is an upstanding
supervisor and that John never interacts with Regina in a discriminatory
way.
Hotel accuses Regina of fabricating the whole incident.
Workforce personnel were not present during any of John's interactions
with Regina, and Workforce has little leverage over John to force John
to confess. So, would a decision-maker find that Workforce has
constructive knowledge here? It depends. But this unpredictability and
lack of clarity puts the staffing firm in a precarious position: (1) believe
Regina, reassign her, and potentially damage its relationship with
Hotel,157 or (2) believe Hotel and face the risk of liability in the future.
Therefore, in addition to being too inflexible, the negligence liability
standard as applied here may be too unclear and unpredictable.
156.
157.

O'Gorman, supra note 17, at469.
Anecdotal evidence, as well as common sense, suggests that clients hold in high regard a

communicative and healthy relationship with the staffing firm. See Mark Scott, Relationships are
Critical to Companies that Rely on Staffing Firms, SMART Bus. (Aug. 1, 2017),
http://www.sbnonline.com/article/relationships-are-critical-to-companies-that-rely-on-stafifmgfirms/ ("In the end, companies tend to value communication and a good working relationship."); see
also Chris Forde, Temporary Arrangements: The Activities ofEmployment Agencies in the UK, 15

WoRK, EMP. & Soc'y 631, 634-37 (2001) (discussing the rise of more personalized relationships
between clients and staffing firms in the UK).
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3. Regina's DiscriminatoryTermination
In the final incident-the discriminatory termination-holding
Workforce to a negligence standard would allow Workforce to escape
15
Workforce
liability for Hotel's discriminatory request for termination.s
did not know about John's statements and, when it investigated the
circumstances surrounding the request, it failed to find out about Hotel's
discriminatory bias. Even then, it still immediately reassigned Regina to
a new client. Thus, it probably did not have constructive knowledge
about the discrimination, and for that reason, it would escape liability.
Some support for the standard as applied here can be found in the
In certain
"customer feedback discrimination" literature. 1 60
circumstances, customer feedback discrimination is similar in structure
to Regina's discriminatory assignment termination. 1 6 1 Imagine that
Hotel revolutionized the industry by allowing its customers the chance to
choose which housekeeper they want and to change the housekeeper
with no questions asked. This policy effectively allows customers to
choose or change their housekeeper based on their explicit or implicit
bias. In other words, the customers can take race or sex into account.
Hotel is essentially outsourcing its decisions concerning housekeeper
reassignment to its customers, giving customers the power to commit an
adverse employment action.
This customer feedback discrimination hypothetical and Regina's
discriminatory termination both involve: (1) a third party with employer
powers (real employer powers in Regina's discriminatory termination
and de facto powers in the customer feedback discrimination hypo), 162
158.

O'Gorman,supra note 17, at 434.

159. Id at 469.
160. Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3-5)
(using the term "customer feedback discrimination").
See, e.g., id.; see also Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment
161.

Discriminationas Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 249, 286 (2016); Brishen Rogers,
The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. Cm. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 95-98 (2015) (recognizing that Uber
makes employment decisions based on customer feedback and the need for law protecting against
employment decisions based on customers biased or discriminatory feedback).
162. Courts are not completely unfamiliar with situations where a third party possesses
employer powers over an employee. The Second Circuit has recognized a situation where an
employer gives employer-like authority to an independent contractor.

See Halpert v. Manhattan

Apartments, Inc., 580 F.3d 86, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2009). The court there identified that an employer
may be liable for an independent contractor's discriminatory employment decisions made on the

employer's behalf. Id. at 88 ("If a company gives an individual authority to interview job applicants
and make hiring decisions on the company's behalf, then the company may be held liable if that
individual improperly discriminates against applicants on the basis of age."); see also Mitchell H.
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(2) exhibiting discriminatory intent, and (3) committing an adverse
employment action (termination and reassignment). 163 And both involve
another party-Hotel in the customer feedback discrimination hypo and
Workforce
in
Regina's
discriminatory
termination-without
discriminatory intent.
Because of the structural similarity between both situations, if the
law holds the employer to a negligence liability standard in customer
feedback discrimination cases, it may make sense to do the same for
Regina's discriminatory termination.
Unfortunately, no court has
addressed this issue directly.16 But Professor Dallan Flake argues that
courts should hold the employer to a direct negligence liability
standard. 1 6 5 Supporting his argument, he notes that courts' pervasive use
of negligence principles under antidiscrimination law "shows the
feasibility of their application to customer feedback discrimination." 1 66
And the standard would encourage employers to investigate any
customer feedback for discriminatory bias, while not being "so onerous"
as to impose an undue financial burden on the employer.1 6 7
At least one commentator has dedicated a whole article to
disparaging the negligence liability standard as applied to the
discriminatory termination of an employee's assignment. 16 8 Professor
O'Gorman argues that a staffing firm should not be liable for the client's

Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and
Employers Who Operate in the BorderlandBetween an Employer-And-Employee Relationship, 14

U. PA. J. Bus. L. 605, 606 (2012) (discussing "quasi-employers" and related liability theories in
work law that implicate these types of entities).
163.
Some courts may view employee reassignment as not rising to the level of an adverse
employment action in Title VII substantive law claims. While the circuit courts are split over when
an action rises to the level of adverse employment action, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits adopt the
narrowest test, holding that "only ultimate employment decisions" qualify as adverse employment

decisions. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that ultimate
employment decisions include "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating"

(citation omitted)); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Changes in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage ...

are

insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case."). Thus, these
circuit courts may find that a reassignment of a hotel housekeeper to another assignment without

any difference in pay or prestige would not constitute an adverse employment action. See Williams
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] purely lateral transfer, that is, a
transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a
materially adverse employment action.").
164. Flake, supra note 160, at 21.
165. Id. at 44.
166. Id at 47.
167. Id. at 48.
168.

See generally O'Gorman, supranote 17.
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discriminatory termination of the employee's assignment. 169 O'Gorman
supports his argument by noting that caselaw, at best, only indirectly
supports applying the negligence liability standard to a client's tangible
employment action.170 When courts do use the standard, they do so
"without critical analysis, sometimes seemingly conceding that the
standard is inappropriate because a staffing firm has no control over a
client.""'
O'Gorman also concludes that this standard, as applied to the
client's tangible employment action, goes against antidiscrimination
statutes' plain language.17 2 The statutes ban discrimination based on a
protected status, and because the staffing firm is not the entity
discriminating nor taking an adverse employment action, the staffing
firm cannot be liable. 17 3 It is not correct to say that the staffing firm
removed the employee from her assignment. Instead, according to
O'Gorman, "the client has removed the employee from the assignment,
and the staffing firm is simply without the power to force the client to
continue the assignment."1 74 Thus, the staffing firm has not committed
an adverse employment action when it acquiesces to the client's
discriminatory termination. 175 In addition to not committing an adverse
employment action, the staffing firm lacks the requisite discriminatory
intent-the staffing firm is only obeying the client's wish because it has
no other choice.17 1

The

statutes'

twin

purposes-deterrence

and

compensating

victimS177-are also not promoted with this standard because the staffing

firm has little power to investigate the client and its workplace, and will
more likely than not believe the client's legitimate non-discriminatory
"Thus, even when the client has
reason for the termination.17 8
discriminated, the staffing firm will rarely reach such a conclusion, even
if it is aware of its potential liability, and the statutes' purposes will not

169. Id. at 436.
170. See id. 441-57.
171. Id. at 456-57.
172. Id. at 459-61.
173. Id. at 459.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id
177. The Supreme Court has described Title VII's key purposes as achieving equality, making
employees whole, and removing discriminatory barriers. See Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358
(1995) (noting that two purposes of both Title VII and the ADEA is deterrence and compensation).
178. O'Gorman, supra note 17, at 462.
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be significantly advanced."' 7 9 O'Gorman also argues that staffing firms
lack control over the offending actor and cannot effectively correct any
of the client's discriminatory bias, hindering the deterrence purpose
behind the statutes.' 8 0
4. Conclusion
As discussed, although the negligence liability standard may help to
deter future discrimination, it is inherently unclear and unpredictable.
This lack of clarity and predictability may place an unfair burden on the
staffing firm. The negligence standard's unpredictability and elasticity
may, at times, prevent an employee from succeeding on a valid claim if
that employee is in front of a decision-maker with a bias for the
employer; and the same might occur for an employer in front of a
decision-maker who is biased in favor of the employee. 8 1
B. StrictLiability When JointEmployer RelationshipExists
Under this standard, Workforce is held strictly liable for harms
inflicted by Hotel regardless of Workforce's negligence, knowledge, or
discriminatory intent. 182 Furthermore, both entities must be in a joint
employer relationship.18 ' Thus, Workforce would be liable in all three
incidents assuming that Hotel engaged in unlawful discrimination and
that both entities are joint employers.
When compared to negligence liability, strict liability is clear and
predictable. The staffing firm would know exactly when it would be
liable: whenever its joint employer client is liable. Of course, there
would be instances where the client's liability would be unclear, but the
staffing firm would not have to go through a separate negligence
analysis as applied to the staffing firm. It would also deter client
discrimination to a greater degree because the threat of strict liability
would presumably be a stronger threat than negligence. It would likely
cause the staffing firm to create mechanisms, concerning the ending and

179.
180.
181.

Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 463.
See generally Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1994)

(examining bias in the judiciary). See also Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L.

REv. 1023, 1074 (2002) (arguing that judges should recognize how "they are influenced by factors
related to the cases they hear" and adjust accordingly).
182.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

183.

See Davidov, supra note 10, at 743.
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beginning of the employment relationship, and concerning the employee
at the workplace, to prevent discrimination. For example, it might
require that each client agree to not discriminate against its employee or
else pay for any legal fees. Or it might require that its personnel be at
the jobsite at all times, acting as a watchdog for any unlawful conduct.
Thus, strict liability for a client's discriminatory acts throughout the
employment relationship furthers the deterrence purpose behind
antidiscrimination law.
Additionally, this regime finds support from the FLSA joint
employer doctrine. 18 4 As I discussed, joint employers are jointly and
Thus, "each joint
severally responsible for FLSA compliance.18 5
employer is individually responsible, for example, for the entire amount
of wages due." 18 6 A strict liability standard whenever a joint employer
relationship exists in the staffing agency context would thus be in line
with the FLSA joint employer doctrine.
But the FLSA and antidiscrimination law differ in a key way: the
FLSA employer definition is much broader than Title VII's definition.1 17
This evidences Congress's intent that the FLSA cover as many entities
as possible.188 Therefore, it may make sense to hold an employer strictly
liable for all the unlawful acts of its joint employer under the FLSA,
while not doing the same under antidiscrimination law.
The strict liability regime finds support from Professor Guy
Davidov. Davidov, discussing work law more generally, argues for a
form of strict liability where the temp agency and the client would be
jointly and severally liable.18 9 Davidov writes that this type of liability
would "relieve[] the courts of some of the need to tangle with blurry
184.

Id. at 734-35.

185.

See sources cited supranotes 88-91 and accompanying text.

186. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter on Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) (Jan. 20, 2016), 2016 WL 284582, at *1 n.4.
187. Carvell & Sherwyn, supra note 90, at 15-16 ("The FLSA defines 'employ' as 'to suffer
or permit to work.'

This is considered among the broadest definitions of 'employ' that has ever

been included in any legislation.... Title VII's definition of an employer is 'much narrower' than
the FLSA's definition."). For more on the FLSA's "employ" definition and its scope, see Bruce
Goldstein

et

al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:

Rediscovering the Statutory Definition ofEmployment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989 (1999) (arguing
that courts have failed to effectuate Congress's intent behind its definition of employ by narrowing

its scope).
See, e.g., Noelle M. Reese, Note, Workfare Participants Deserve Employment
188.
Protections Under the FairLabor Standards Act and Workers' Compensation Laws, 31 RuTGERS

L.J. 873, 884 (2000) ("The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that courts should
construe the [FLSA] liberally to achieve the congressional intent of broad coverage in favor of
employees."); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1985).
189. See Davidov supra note 10, at 743.
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lines, and minimizes the extent to which employers can use such blurry
lines to escape responsibilities."l 90
But as I have discussed extensively, a broad strict liability regime
does not find much support from caselaw because caselaw tends to
follow the negligence liability standard where a joint employer
relationship exists.' 9 1 Plus, exposing a staffing firm to this much
liability might force staffing firms to go out of business or otherwise
cause them to run less efficiently.
Such inefficiency might be
detrimental to workers and firms more generally in the competitive
market. Thus, while this regime has theoretical and normative appeal, it
might be too rigid and too harsh to apply to staffing firmS. 192
C. Liability Only if the Temp Agency Engages in DisparateTreatment
This regime would hold Workforce liable only if it acted because of
its employee's protected status. This type of liability is a form of direct
liability where the staffing firm only breaches its duties to the employee
when the firm itself harms that employee because of a protected
category. In all three incidents, Workforce did not act because of
Regina's sex, race, color, etc. For example, when Hotel asked that
Regina be terminated from her assignment, Workforce complied not
because of Regina's protected status, but because of Hotel's request.
Similarly, at assignment, Workforce did not fail to assign Regina to
Hotel based of her race. Finally, at the worksite Workforce personnel
never engaged in any harassment and did not explicitly approve of or
Thus, because Workforce lacked
help John harass Regina.
discriminatory intent, it would not be liable for any of the three
incidents.
This regime is in line with the conventional view that Title VII
"recognizes only disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
employment discrimination."' 9 3 The three incidents do not implicate
any disparate impact theory, and because Workforce nor any of its
agents engaged in discrimination, Workforce has not engaged in
disparate treatment. To hold Workforce liable, a decision-maker would

&

190. Id. at 744.
191. See Flake, supra note 102, at 1211.
192. For a discussion of other objections to, and, possible justifications for, strict liability more
generally, see Stephen Cohen, Justificationfor a Doctrine of Strict Liability, 8 SOC. THEORY
PRAC. 213, 214 (1982).
193. Zatz, supra note 6, at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)).
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have to turn to the employment discrimination theory of nonmust reasonably accommodate its
accommodation-Workforce
employee that was harmed by Hotel's discriminatory acts by taking
corrective action. Those subscribing to the conventional view would
argue that non-accommodation theories have no place in Title VII
doctrine. 194 Thus, holding Workforce liable only if it engages in
disparate treatment finds support from the conventional view.
This standard would encourage a staffing agency to only concern
itself with its own actions. For example, it would be unlikely to create
certain deterrence mechanism to prevent its clients from discriminating
against its employees. This standard, at least partially, goes against Title
VII's policy of encouraging "the creation of antiharassment policies and
effective guidance mechanisms."l95 Although a staffing firm may be
inclined to create an antiharassment policy for its own workplace, it
would not be incentivized to create any kind of policy for its employees
while at one of its clients. On the other hand, this standard would allow
the staffing firm to spend more energy and money into expanding its
business--energy and money that would have been spent on limiting its
clients' discrimination. This might be beneficial for its employees if the
staffing firm reinvests those benefits reaped from expansion back into its
employees through wages, benefits, training, etc.
Overall though, because this standard has the potential to cause
staffing firms to only be concerned with itself and not with its clients'
possible discriminatory actions, it is probably not a viable standard to
address our dilemma.
IV. THE SOLUTION: FUNCTIONAL EMPLOYER LIABILITY

This paper proposes a new temp agency employer responsibility
standard for a client's discriminatory actions: the functional liability
standard. This standard draws from Jeremias Prassl's work to develop a
functional concept of the employer. 19 6 Prassl argues that the concept of
the employer should mean: "[T]he entity, or combination of entities,
playing a decisive role in the exercise of relational employing functions,
and regulated or controlled as such in each particular domain of
employment law." 197

Thus, Prassl argues that we should define an employer by its
194.
195.
196.
197.

See, e.g., id at 1362-63.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
See generally PRASSL, supra note 18.
Id. at 6.
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exercise of explicit functions. 198 And in multi-entity relationships, such
as the agency-client-employee relationship, the legally responsible
"employer" is the one that exercises the relevant employer function. 199
Prassl lays out five employer functions: (1) the employer's hiring and
firing powers; (2) the employer's power to obtain the employee's work
and the employee's work-product; (3) the employer's duty to pay the
employee wages and to give the employee work; (4) the employer's
control over all aspects of production; and (5) the employer's ability to
expose itself to economic profit or loss. 2 00
For purposes of different legal claims, an employee might have a
different employer depending on which employer function the claim
implicates.
Recall the hypo discussed above regarding Regina,
Workforce, and Hotel. Workforce oversees paying Regina and Hotel
does not set the wage rate. For purposes of a minimum wage violation,
the employer would be Workforce because it is responsible for paying
Regina. The employer in that situation would not be Hotel. In other
words, the employer in question is defined by its function-paying
wages.
Professor Hugh Collins summarizes Prassl's legal standard as the
following: "[A]n entity should be regarded as the employer if it either
actually carries out the relevant employment function or if it is legally
entitled to perform that function,, 20 1
But, what about employer
functions that are shared among several loci of control? Who should be
the relevant employer? Suppose Hotel asks Workforce to terminate
Regina (for discriminatory reasons) from her assignment, and the agency
complies. Which entity is the relevant employer? You can argue that
Hotel is the employer because it set into motion the termination by
asking Workforce to end the employment. But Workforce is the entity
that complied or, in one sense, ratified the client's actions. Or, could it
be that both that Workforce and Hotel are the relevant employers here?
As Collins notes, 202 Prassl gives some guidance on this issue: the "lead

198. Id; see also Jeremias Prass1 & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms As
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 619, 64647 (2016); Jeremias Prassl, The Employment Impact of Private Equity Investors: A Return of the

Barbarians?,44 IND. L. J. 150, 157 (2015) (book review); Ewan McGaughey, Social Rights and the
Function ofEmploying Entities, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 482, 482-83 (2017).
199. Prass1 & Risak, supra note 198, at 621.
200.
PRASSL, supra note 18, at 32.
201.
Hugh Collins, A Review of the Concept of the Employer by Dr Jeremias Prassl, U. OF
OXFORD FAC. OF L.: LAB. L. BLoG (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/content/labour-law-

0/blog/2015/1 1/review-concept-employer-dr-jeremias-prassl.
202. Id.
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or primary" entity should be the responsible employer, "without undue
deference to formalism, however, in case backup becomes required." 2 0 3
Collins finds this guidance unhelpful, stating, "[b]ut if no-one was
performing the function of employer at all or nobody was taking the lead
responsibility, the facts will simply not tell us the answer the question of
who is the employer." 2 0 4 Collins then proposes a fix to this dilemma:
The responsible employer is the one who could have complied with the
law at the least cost.2 0 5

But this fix is unhelpful as well. How does a court determine which
entity could have complied with the least cost? Does the court consider
non-monetary costs including monetary costs? I propose that when both
entities share the relevant employer functions, both entities are the
relevant employer. This reduces any confusion or ambiguity. So, in the
hypo involving Regina above, where both entities had control over the
end of her employment relationship, the agency would be strictly liable
for its client's discriminatory actions even if it did not know about the
discrimination. But suppose Workforce accommodated the employee's
harm by immediately reassigning Regina or reimbursing Regina for any
harm. In this situation, Workforce would have an affirmative defense
even though the law at issue implicated the agency's employer function.
A. Overview of the Proposal
I summarize my proposal as the following: A staffing firm is liable
for its client's discriminatory act if the discriminatory act involves,
arises from, or directly relates to one of the firm's employment
functions. An employment function is one that the agency actually
engages in or one that it is legally obligated to engage in.206 An agency
is still the responsible employer even if the agency shares control over
an employment function with the client.
I have slightly changed Prassl's employer functions to make them
more relevant to the temp agency and employment discrimination
context. I kept function one the same, but function three is split up into
two separate functions: providing work and providing pay. And
functions two and five are unlikely to be relevant in this context, so I
203.

PRASSL, supra note 18, at 187.

204. Collins, supra note 201.
205. Id.
206.
I changed Professor Hugh Collins' restatement of Prassl's rule from "legally entitled" to
"legally obligated." See id. Legally entitled seems too broad and ambiguous. A legal obligation
refers to a legal requirement such as a law requiring that a staffing firm pay wages to the employee.
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dropped them from the list. My revised functions are the following:
(1) Inception and Termination of the Employment Relationship
(2) Providing Work
(3) ProvidingPay
(4) Managing the Enterprise-InternalMarket
Note that the entirety of function one (both inception and
termination powers) is implicated if the agency exercises, or is
contractually obligated to exercise, either inception or termination. For
example, if an agency has no say in termination, but has some power
over inception (a staffing agency should inherently have this power),
then the agency also exercises powers related to termination.2 07
B. The Affirmative Defense: ReasonableAccommodation
1. Overview
Under my proposal, the staffing firm may escape liability if it can
show that it reasonably accommodated the discriminatory harm. The
burden is on the employer to prove reasonable accommodation. A
staffing firm satisfies this affirmative defense when it shows that it either
accommodated the harmed employee such that the employee is made
whole or it made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee, but
the employee refused the accommodation.
Reasonableness is
determined by looking at the specific circumstances and all the relevant
facts, and it is satisfied if it is effective in (1) making the employee
whole and (2) achieving equal opportunity.20 8
For example, suppose that Hotel creates a policy prohibiting
207. This conception of function one allows courts to simplify their analysis. For example,
suppose a client's discrimination implicates the employment function of termination. And it is
unclear as to whether the staffing firm engaged or was legally obligated to engage in the termination
employer function. The court need not go into a lengthy analysis. Instead, it can merely recognize

that the staffing firm engages in beginning the employment relationship, and end their analysis
there, finding the staffing firm strictly liable for the harm. Of course, as I will discuss further, the
firm can reasonably accommodate the employee's harm to escape liability.
208. Generally, the ADA requires that the employee show that a proposed accommodation is
reasonable "in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs." See Vande Zande v. Wis.

Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995). Contrarily, here, the employer has the burden to
show that the accommodation it gave, or, attempted to give, was effective and reasonable for the
employee. Thus, it may be effective to place the temporary employee back with an unscrupulous
client-assuming that client won't harm the employee again-but it may be unreasonable for the

employee considering her financial, emotional, or physical well-being.
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women from using of certain cleaning agents containing ammonia or
bleach. Hotel thought that such chemicals may harm women to a greater
degree than men, and, thus, thought it appropriate to implement this
policy. Violation of this policy by any employee would result in
termination. Regina, upset about her cleaning supplies being less
effective, uses the banned cleaning agents with ammonia and bleach.
Hotel finds out and terminates Regina.
The termination implicates the employer function of ending and
beginning the employment relationship. Workforce engages in this
employer function and is therefore strictly liable.209
How may Workforce reasonably accommodate this harm?
Workforce has several options. Workforce may (1) order Hotel to
reinstate Regina with backpay and ensure that the policy does not apply
to other temporary employees; (2) immediately reassign Regina to a
similar client without a related policy and give her backpay; or (3) assist
Regina in litigation against Hotel seeking relief. All these would
probably be reasonable accommodations that would make Regina whole
and bring her equality.
Workforce need not even know that the policy is unlawful or
potentially unlawful for the affirmative defense to apply. Suppose that
Hotel never tells Workforce the reasons for the firing under a "no
questions asked" policy. Under this policy, Workforce may not ask why
Hotel terminated Regina, but must immediately reassign Regina and
provide her with backpay. If Regina later sues Hotel and Workforce,
although Hotel would be liable, Workforce would have satisfied the
affirmative defense.
At first glance, a lack of a knowledge requirement may seem too
favorable to the staffing firm. For example, a staffing firm can escape
liability even if it does not act with the specific intent to stamp out its
client's discrimination. But the lack of knowledge requirement cuts both
ways. A staffing firm may never have any notice of discrimination and
may otherwise be without fault, and it still might not satisfy the
Plus, a knowledge requirement would limit
affirmative defense.
instances where a staffing firm could escape liability to only those
instances where it knew of the employee's harm. This might be too
209.

Hotel's policy would violate Title VII because it took sex into account when creating

and implementing the policy. Further, the policy itself is facially discriminatory. See, e.g., UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) (finding employer's fetal-protection policy
unlawful because policy excluded only fertile women from lead-exposed jobs); City of L.A. Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) (finding pension contribution policy
unlawful because it required that women pay more into employer-operated fund than men).
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unforgiving.
Besides a knowledge requirement being too harsh on a staffing
firm, it would also require a court to engage in excessive inquiry into the
employer's mens rea. One of the functional liability's appeals is that it
does not require laborious review and investigation into the employer's
thought process. Thus, an affirmative defense that requires such review
would negate one of the functional standard's appealing attributes. For
these reasons, it makes more sense not to require employer knowledge.
2. PotentialChallenges to the Affirmative Defense
Other employees not receiving reasonable accommodation under
my proposal's regime may argue that the affirmative defense entails
special or preferential treatment. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the
Supreme Court faced a similar argument made by the employer, US
Airways.210 Robert Bamett injured his back on the job and transferred to
a mailroom position, a less physically demanding position. 2 11 After
being in that position for two years, other employees that were senior to
Barnett sought his mailroom position.212 Barnett requested that US
Airways keep him in the mailroom and make an exception to the
211
US Airways eventually denied his
company's seniority system.21
request and Barnett lost his job.2 14
US Airways argued that by providing Barnett an exception to a
neutral rule, it would have been required to provide special or
preferential treatment to Barnett at the expense of other employees.215
Justice Breyer wrote that such special treatment was sometimes
necessary to realize the goals of the ADA. Accommodation, by its very
definition, "requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability
differently, i.e., preferentially." 2 16
One can imagine a similar situation in the staffing firm context.
Workforce's client fires Regina because she is black. As part of
Workforce's attempt to reasonably accommodate Regina, it places her
application in the front of all the other employee's applications for
placement. The next client that requests a temporary worker will get

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 397.
Id.
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Regina first. Other temp employees that find out about this, may argue
that Workforce is giving Regina special treatment and the law does not
allow such treatment. Employees that are let go by a client because of
something other than sex, race, national origin, disability, etc. would not
get this kind of treatment.
What is different about Regina's situation and Barnett's is that the
ADA, as Justice Breyer noted, requires preferences. 2 17 Here, Title VII,
at least on its face, does not require any kind of preferences or special
treatment.218 In other words, Title VII is symmetrical, while the ADA is
explicitly asymmetrical. 2 19 Thus, the employees' argument against
Workforce may be more akin to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison22 0 where the Supreme Court dealt with a Title VII claim.
Hardison involved reasonable accommodation for an employee
with religious needs under Title VII. 22 1 The employer, TWA, fired
Larry Hardison after he refused to work on Saturdays.2 22 Hardison's
religion required that he refrain from working on the Sabbath, which is
all day Saturday. 223 He was ordered to work Saturdays when his coworker took time off for vacation.224 To provide an exception for
Hardison would, among other things, result in a violation of the seniority
agreement in his union contract.225 Or it would result in Hardison only
working four days a week, which would further necessitate a supervisor
filling his position, or require employing someone who does not
regularly work on Saturdays and paying that person premium wages.2 26
The court, finding for the employer, emphasized that any
accommodation would result in other employees losing out on rights
under their union contract. 227 And the accommodation would be unfair
because it would have harmed other employees who could not get
Saturdays off for "strong, but perhaps nonreligious, reasons .. 228
217.
218.

See id.
See id.

219.

See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Casefor Symmetry in AntidiscriminationLaw, 2017 WIs.

L. REv. 69, 71 (2017) (recognizing symmetry and asymmetry in different areas of antidiscrimination
law); see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 290-91 (1976) (holding that
Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of race regardless of the type of race at issue).
220. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 63 (1977).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 68-69.
223. Id. at 67-68.
224. Id. at 68.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 68-69.
227. Id. at 81.
228. Id.
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Such "unequal treatment" could not occur in a Title VII regime.22 9
When compared to Regina's situation, the discriminatory harm that
the employer accommodates is more prominent than the discriminatory
harm in Hardison. In fact, no employer engaged in disparate treatment
in Hardison.2 30 Hardison could not work on Saturday because of his
religion. 2 31 The employer refused to heed his requests to get Saturday
off, not because of religion, but because it would result in inequality or
232
unequal treatment.22 In Regina's situation, we can point to Hotel's
disparate treatment-its discriminatory policy. In other words, both
situations involve external status causation, but we can point to a
specific employer-like entity that takes a protected status into account in
Regina's situation. In Hardison, religion entered the causal chain before
TWA terminated Hardison and outside of TWA's thought process. 233
But what does it mean to complain about "unequal treatment"?
This argument requires three assumptions. First, there exists a baseline
that is used to measure what is equal or unequal. Second, this baseline
rests in a world where the employer does not accommodate the
employee to the disadvantage of co-workers. Third, the baseline is
neutral, and any action deviating from the baseline represents favoritism
or bias.
In Hardison, the neutral baseline is one that fails to consider
Hardison's religious beliefs.234 Suppose that the baseline is one where
all religious beliefs are accommodated and any non-accommodation
represents a deviation. This was surely Hardison's view.2 35 The court
may have come to a different decision if it took this view of the
baseline-that accommodation was not unequal.
Rather, nonaccommodation would maintain inequality.
In Regina's situation, we can also view the relevant baseline as one
where Hotel's disparate treatment does not exist. And making Regina
whole is merely shifting all employees, as a whole, back to the
baseline.23 6

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

236.

Scholars have recognized versions of this type of "special treatment" argument or

("Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment.").
at 77.
at 67.
at 81.
at 67-69.
at 69.

baseline assumption in antidiscrimination law.

See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Special Treatment

Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. REv. 1155, 1156 (2015). Zatz notes that
special treatment arguments exist throughout U.S. employment discrimination law. Id. at 1178.
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C. FunctionalLiability as a Category ofDirect Liability
I argue that this proposal is best viewed as a type of direct liability
where a duty is placed on the staffing firm to prevent discrimination,
regardless of where it comes from, during any of its employer functions.
So, when the client engages in discrimination during the staffing firm's
employer function, that firm is directly liable for breaching its duty to its
harmed employee. Recall that the court in Romero, placed a similar duty
on the employee's union.237 The court wrote:
With respect to the assertion that the union consented to the
Railroad's alleged discriminatory delay in reinstating Romero,
we point out that labor organizations have an affirmative duty
to insure compliance with Title VII. If a union does not take
action against discriminatory practices by an employer, it may
2 38
be held responsible for those practices.
In general, a staffing firm holds a different position in relation to its
239
For example, a
employees than a union holds to its union members.
power of its
bargaining
the
increase
is
to
unions
labor
of
goal
key
240
One
wages.
and
conditions
working
members, and advocate for better
against
view is that unions were created to "unit[e] the class of workers
the class of management." 2 4 1 In other words, unions exist to represent
And that these arguments are "confused, a confusion enabled by failure to acknowledge the relevant
Id. at 1158; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational
nondiscriminatory baseline."
Discrimination,", Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability)Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REv. 825,
862 (2003) (arguing that, contrary to arguments that accommodation requires redistribution,
accommodation restores a just distribution). Cass Sunstein has described a version of the baseline
assumption underlying Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Sunstein argues that the Lochner
Court's conception of neutrality-as opposed to government intervention-rested on "common law
distribution of entitlements and wealth." Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873, 917 (1987) ("Once the common law system came to be seen as a product of legal rules, the

baseline from which constitutional decisions were made had to shift.").
237. See Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Donnell
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Labor unions, as well as employers,
.

have an affirmative duty to take corrective steps and to insure compliance with Title VII.
(footnote omitted)).
238. Romero, 615 F.2d at 1310 (internal citation omitted). Recall, however, that the courts
after Romero developed the deliberate acquiescence theory, seemingly requiring that the union have
some knowledge of the employer's discrimination before it could be liable. See Greenier v. Pace,

Local No. 1188, 201 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182 (D. Me. 2002).
239. See Pirruccello,supra note 43, at 196.
240.

See Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61

&

HARV. L. REv. 274, 283 (1948).
241. Andrew W. Neidhardt, The Federalist View of Right-to- Work Laws, 18 U. PA. J.L.
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and further the interests of labor.24 2 On the other hand, the staffing firm
inherently has different motives and goals. First and foremost, its chief
goal is to serve its clients and stay in business. And work law tends to
classify staffing firms like other employers-i.e. the staffing firm in the
private sector employs its temp workers on an at-will basis and the firm
is not required to advocate on behalf of the temp worker any differently
than other employers.243
Because of these differences, it may make sense to not create the
Romero duty for the staffing firm. But what I argue is slightly different.
Rather than create a broad duty to assure nondiscrimination, I suggest
that the law impose this duty only when the staffing firm is engaging in a
specific employer function. This compromise is appropriate, assuming
that Romero's holding is correct, given the differences between a union
and a staffing firm.
D. Differences and Similaritieswith the Negligence Liability
Standard
Through looking at several hypotheticals, I hope to compare the
functional standard to the current standard used by most courts-the
negligence liability standard. I begin by examining discrimination at job
assignment and termination. I then look at discrimination at the
worksite. And I end by analyzing discriminatory wage practices.
1. Job Assignment and Termination
Generally, the temporary staffing agency engages in function onethe inception and termination of employment. 2 " It interviews and
decides which workers to place at its client's workplace. Even if an
agency does not have a say in the ending of the worker's assignment,
through its control of assigning workers (inception), the staffing agency
exercises all of function one-including termination powers. 245 Thus,
any client discrimination arising from the inception or the ending of the
employment relationship automatically creates agency liability.
Suppose Workforce enacts a policy that requires it to comply with
its client's requests no matter what, with no questions asked. Workforce
soc. CHANGE 251, 277 (2015).
242. Id.
243.

See supra Part I.

244.
245.

See supra Part W.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
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gives its client, Hotel, a worker who happens to be black. Despite the
worker's qualifications, Hotel declines the black worker's assignment on
the worker's first day at work. Citing its "no questions asked" policy
requiring it to comply, Workforce takes the worker off the assignment.
The real reason for Hotel's refusal is that it prefers to hire white or
Hispanic workers. But Workforce never asks why Hotel refused and
never has constructive knowledge of why. And the worker never told
Workforce that Hotel discriminated against her because she was black.
Workforce merely complied with Hotel because of Workforce's policy.
The worker then sues both Workforce and Hotel alleging discrimination
under Title VII.
Under the negligence standard, Workforce was not negligent to the
discrimination. Hotel and the worker never hinted to Workforce that
Hotel harbored discriminatory intent. Thus, Workforce is not liable.
But under the functional liability standard, both Workforce and
Hotel would be held liable. The relevant employer function is function
one-inception and termination of the employment relationshipbecause the employee's assignment was terminated. Workforce picked
the worker to be assigned to Hotel. This began the employment
relationship. And Workforce complied with Hotel's request to remove
the worker from assignment. This ended the employment relationship.
Thus, regardless of Workforce's intent or knowledge of discrimination,
it would be liable because Workforce actually engaged in the inception
or termination of the employment relationship.24 6
Further, because Workforce requested that Hotel assign its temp
worker, Workforce exercises function one even if it has no say in the
termination. Of course, this employer function can be stronger or
weaker for the agency depending on the context. But as long as a temp
agency has the power to give workers to the client, it actually engages
in, or is legally obligated to engage in, function one.
The negligence liability standard and the functional standard merge
when Workforce knows that Hotel is discriminating and refuses to
comply with Hotel's request. For example, Workforce could oppose
Hotel's demand, end its contract with Hotel, and place the worker in the
next available assignment. This would likely fulfill the corrective action
requirement of the current standard and the functional standard's
But for the
affirmative defense of reasonable accommodation.
functional standard, the agency would bear the burden of proving the
This contrasts with the current standard's
affirmative defense.
246.

See supra Part III.A.
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requirement that the employee bear the burden of proving that the
agency failed to take corrective action.
2. At the Worksite
Unlike at job assignment and termination, discrimination only
affecting worksite conditions are likely only to implicate the client's
function-function four (managing the enterprise-internal market).
For instance, recall incident two of the hypo in the previous part where
Hotel's supervisor John harasses Regina. The harassment Regina
suffered was so severe that it qualified as a hostile work environment.
Generally, a temp agency does not control any aspect of the client's
workplace, such as its production or its day-to-day operations.24 7
Further, a temp agency generally does not have control over the client's
supervisors.2 48 Thus, even if Workforce knew about the harassment and
could have taken corrective action, i.e. taking the worker out of the
assignment and ending its contract with the client, Workforce would not
be held liable under the functional standard. Under the current standard,
Workforce would be liable if it knew of the harassment and failed to
take action.
As an additional wrinkle, suppose that Regina's hostile work
environment culminates in Regina opposing the harassment, and Hotel
demands that Workforce end her assignment in retaliation for the
opposition. If the agency complies, even for a non-discriminatory
reason, it would be liable for the employee's retaliation claim because
the claim directly relates to Workforce's employer function (inception
and termination of employment). However, it still would not be liable
under the hostile work environment claim, assuming the employee does
not group the termination as part of the hostile work environment claim.
What if Hotel discriminates against Regina by refusing to give her
enough work? This implicates function two-providing work. And it
implicates function four. Under function two, the provision of day-today work is likely a function of the client, and not the agency. 249 But the
agency might have some say in what work and how much work the
client gives to its employee generally. For instance, the agency might
contract with the client requiring the client to give the temp worker at

247.
248.

See PRASSL, supra note 18, at 51.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.

249.

PRASSL, supra note 18, at 51 ("[T]he provision of day-to-day work is ...

clearly a role of

the end-user . . .. ").
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least thirty hours a week. If it does, then the agency is strictly liable.250
The agency may accommodate the employee and escape liability under
the affirmative defense. 25 1 For example, if Hotel discriminates against
Regina by refusing to give her thirty hours per week because of her sex,
even if Workforce fails to recognize Hotel's discriminatory intent,
Workforce would escape liability if it reasonably accommodated Regina
through additional hours at another assignment, reassignment, or
additional pay to make up for the hours lost due to her sex.
Consider a client's discriminatory suspension: Which function or
functions does that fall under? It probably does not fall under function
one because it does not have to do with the beginning or the ending of
the employment relationship. But functions two and four are implicated
because the employer is both refusing to give the employee work
(function two) and is exercising its power to manage the internal
processes of its enterprise (function four). If there is a suspension
without pay, then function three is implicated. Thus, the agency would
be strictly liable if it engaged in any of those functions (two, three, or
four). Comparing this situation under the traditional rule, a court would
have to determine if the agency was negligent as to the discriminatory
suspension and whether it took corrective action.252
3. Wage Practices
253
aon
The amount
Generally, the agency pays the employee wages.
that the agency pays the employee is determined by both the agency and
the client, or the pay level is determined by how much the client pays the
251
Thus, so long as the agency gives the
agency for its services.25
employees' wages or has some hand in setting the wage level, it engages
in function three. And it is therefore liable for any of its client's
discriminatory wage practices.25 5 Suppose that Hotel decides that it
wants to pay a Hispanic worker less money based on the stereotype that
Hispanic workers will accept a lower wage. It tells Workforce that it
needs to cut that worker's wage because the worker is not as efficient as
other workers. Workforce complies and gives the worker less money on
Even without Workforce's knowledge of Hotel's
her paycheck.

250.
251.
252.

See id at 186.
See supra Part V.B.1.
See supra Part IV.B.1.

253.

PRASSL, supra note 18, at 51.

254.
255.

Id. at 51-52.
See infra Part IV.F.
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discrimination, it is liable. Under the current standard, the agency is not
liable because it was not negligent to Hotel's discrimination.
But you could imagine a situation where the agency completely
relieves itself of function three. For example, an agency gives the client
a worker. The worker and client agree on a wage and the client pays the
worker wages. The agency has no say in setting the wage or in
determining the payment method. In that scenario, the agency would not
be liable for discriminatory wage practices even with knowledge of that
in discriminatory wage practices. 256
the client was engaging
E. The Functional Liability Standard is Justified by Vicarious
Liability Principlesand by a FairnessConcern
While I consider the functional liability standard a type of direct
liability, vicarious liability principles might be used to justify a
heightened duty during a temp agency's employer functions. Let us
assume that a staffing firm engages in the function of beginning and
ending the employment relationship-which, in principle, it always
should be engaging in. One justification for vicarious liability is
choice.257 At assignment, the staffing firm is choosing to contract with
an end-user client and is consequently holding that client out to the
potential temporary worker its assigning as an entity deserving of
reliance. The temporary worker, by deciding to accept the assignment
with the client, is relying on the agency's choice of the client. And the
staffing firm's choice of its client is most evident to the worker at
assignment because that is when the worker is explicitly presented with
the choice for the first time.
Another vicarious liability justification is control.25 8 The staffing
firm's control over its client is likely at its highest when the client is
engaging in its employer function. At assignment or termination, the
staffing firm can implement mechanisms to detect and prevent
discrimination by its client. It can fail to disclose the protected status of
the potential employee to the client at assignment. At termination, it can
require that its client give a non-discriminatory reason for its request for
reassignment. For supervisor or co-worker harassment at the client's
workplace, where the staffing firm is unlikely to play any part in
employer functions, the staffing firm inherently has less control over the

256.
257.

See infra Part I.F.
See supra Part II.A.

258.

See supra Part II.A.
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client's actions.
Finally, an additional justification for vicarious liability is
causation. At assignment or termination, the probability that the client
will discriminate and the extent of the client's discrimination depends on
the staffing firm's contractual relationship with the client and the power
that the firm grants its client over the potential employees. 2 59 As
discussed, the staffing firm can easily implement mechanisms to prevent
its client from discriminating here-i.e. not disclosing the race, sex,
national origin, etc. of the employee to the client or requiring a nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Further, rejecting, accepting, or
terminating employment is a tangible employment action committed by
high-level management in both entities.260
Besides vicarious liability principles, a concern of fairness justifies
holding a staffing firm strictly liable during its employer functions.
Imagine that an employer directly employs employees without using a
staffing firm. The employer's human resources department or some sort
of in-house recruitment department would probably perform the
employer functions usually performed by a staffing firm: scouting
employees, vetting them, training them, and placing them at the
workplace. Imagine further that the recruitment department tells general
management that it wants to hire a female employee, and general
management disagrees because it only wants to hire men. In this
instance, this company, as a whole, including its recruitment department,
would be liable for sex discrimination. Using a staffing firm as an
outsourced recruitment department allows the staffing firm to escape
liability when it otherwise would not if it were in-house at the company.
Thus, fairness dictates holding a staffing firm strictly liable when
engaging in an employer function.
F. The FunctionalLiability Standardis Justified by the Participation
Theory of Employment
The functional liability standard is consistent with Professor
Matthew Bodie's theory of employment as participation in a firm.26 1
This theory argues that the proper definition of employment should not
259.
260.

See Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 511-13 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Id at 507-08.

261.

See Matthew T. Bodie, Participationas a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 661 (2013) [hereinafter Bodie, Participation];see also Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as
Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 822 (2017) (using the participation theory of
employment to justify the argument that employers owe fiduciary duties to their employees).
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involve an analysis into the level of employer control.26 2 An employee
is defined by the level of participation she has in the putative employer's
common economic enterprise.2 6 3 Thus, to be an employee, a worker
must be "within the boundaries of the firm."264
Through a lens of employee participation, the functional liability
standard as applied to the loyal matchmaker dilemma makes sense.
Where the worker is directly participating in the staffing firm's
productive processes, that staffing firm is more likely to be liable for
discrimination under the functional standard. For example, a staffing
firm's central process is to find temporary workers and assign them to
employees. The staffing firm makes its money from these assignments.
Thus, it makes sense that a staffing firm be strictly liable for any
discrimination occurring at assignment or termination of assignment
since the employee is directly participating in those processes.
On the other hand, whatever harassment or discrimination that
occurs while the employee is at the client's workplace is further
removed from the staffing firm's central production processes. In fact,
while the temp is at the client's workplace, she is mainly participating in
the client's productive processes. Thus, it makes sense to not hold the
staffing firm liable here.
In other words, the staffing firm's central processes are closely
related to its employer functions. Where a temporary employee is
participating in the staffing firm's processes, the staffing firm is bound
to be acting within its employer functions.26 5 Contrastingly, where a
temporary employee is not directly participating in the firm's processes,
the client's employer functions are likely to be at play.

G. The Appeal and the Disadvantagesof FunctionalLiability Under
262. See e.g., Magnuson v. Peak Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Parker v. Golden Peanut, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708 (E.D. Va. 2015); Lee v. Mobile Cty.
Comm'n, 954 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (S.D. Ala. 1995), af'd, 103 F.3d 148 (11th Cir. 1996); Butler v.
Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408-10 (4th Cir. 2015).
263. Bodie, Participation,supra note 261, at 705 ("It is not that employees are controlled by
the firm that makes them employees. It is rather that they are part of a process of joint production,
acting together within one unit.").

264.

Id. at 706. Bodie derives his theory from theory of the firm scholarship and argues that

the standard control test to determine whether an employee-employer relationship exists is

inapplicable to modem forms of economic production. Id. at 664-66. Instead of focusing on
employment as ideas about employees, the concept of employment should be focused on employers.
Id. at 664-65.
265. See discussionsupra Section W.A.
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US. AntidiscriminationLaw
The functional standard is less ambiguous and easier to apply than
the negligence liability standard. To find liability, a court does not have
to engage in intensive fact finding surrounding the agency's knowledge
or lack of knowledge of the discrimination. Instead, a court need only
look at whether the agency engaged in the implicated function. The only
type of in-depth inquiry involved is the affirmative defense inquiry
where it looks at reasonable accommodation.
The functional standard creates more incentive for an employer to
eliminate client discrimination. Because the agency is strictly liable, it is
likely that it would work harder to root out their client's implicit or
For example, a client requests that its worker be
explicit bias.
terminated from her assignment. The agency then has an incentive to
work extra hard to ensure there was no discrimination or bias because it
is strictly liable. This work might include an independent investigation,
interviews, etc. Compare this to the negligent standard under current
law. Where a court only holds an employer to a negligent standard, the
employer has less concern to root out a client's discrimination.
On the other hand, the functional standard creates an incentive to
limit the agency's employer functions. To avoid liability, temp agencies
might stop playing any role in functions two, three, and four. It could
theoretically have no control or say over the provision of work, the
provision of pay, and workplace operations and processes (functions
two, three, and four respectively). But it would have to stop being a
temp agency to relieve itself of function one-powers over the
employment relationship. Because as long as it assigns workers to its
clients, it is engaging in function one. It is unclear if the benefits of
removing these employer functions (less chance of liability) would
outweigh any costs. For instance, a client might not want to contract
with an agency if the agency does not pay the employee or if it does not
have some role in the provision of work. So, market forces might work
to prevent some agencies from completely relieving itself of functions
two, three, and four.
While making it easier to find an agency liable for issues arising
from hiring and firing, and from wage practices, the functional standard
would make it more difficult to find agency liability for client
discrimination at the workplace. As discussed, it is unlikely that an
agency will engage in function four. You could argue that this is how
the law should treat the temp agency. For example, under Dunn's
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rationale, the agency might not be liable.266 In Dunn, the court held the
employer liable for a third-party's discriminatory acts partly because
those acts occurred at the employer's workplace.26 7
If all the
discriminatory acts arose from the client's workplace and did not
implicate any of the agency's employer functions, then it should not be
held liable. 268 Plus, if the agency truly does not engage in any employer
functions related to workplace processes, then it is unlikely to be able to
take any corrective action under the current standard. So maybe the
functional standard is not completely changing the legal landscape.
On the other hand, by limiting liability here, an agency has less
incentive to help the employee who is being harassed or harmed at the
workplace. While there are some market pressures on an agency to keep
a client's workplace harassment free, those might not be enough at the
margins. Thus, it may be worthwhile to consider keeping the negligence
liability standard for workplace issues not implicating any of the
agency's employer functions.
But note that while the functional liability standard limits employer
responsibility at the workplaces, it vastly expands employer
responsibility in other contexts. As discussed, there exists several
factual scenarios where an agency would not be liable under a
negligence liability standard but would be liable under the functional
standard. Similarly, because the functional standard views the employer
through its employer functions, strict liability is used narrowly, only in
circumstances where it is likely justified under vicarious liability
principles.
The functional standard may also be consistent with employee
expectations. To the extent that the employee perceives the staffing firm
engage in an employer function, that employee should also expect that
the staffing firm be liable for discrimination occurring during that
function. Contrarily, when a staffing firm affirmatively disclaims an
employer function, say paying wages, the employee should have little
reason to suspect that the staffing firm would be liable for discrimination
based on her wages.
This standard's consistency with employee expectations would
contribute to less instances of employee-perceived organizational
injustice. Organizational psychology literature recognizes two kinds of

266. Dunn v. Wash. Cty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005).
267. Id. (noting that it is the employer's responsibility to exclude discriminatory people or
entities from its "premises").
268. Id.
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26 9
Distributive
organizational justice: distributive and procedural.
organizational
organizational justice is most relevant here. Distributive
justice refers to perceived outcome fairness, while procedural
2 0
organizational justice refers to perceived process fairness. 7 According
to one strand of scholarship, distributive justice occurs when employee
expectations match actual outcomes.2 71
Recall the discriminatory assignment incident I described in the
previous part. Regina should expect Workforce to be liable for anything
directly involving Regina's assignment to Hotel because Workforce
played a huge role in that function. But, as I discussed, under a
negligence standard or where the staffing firm is only liable for its own
272
discrimination, Workforce would escape liability.

Thus, Regina's

expectations would not match the actual outcome, resulting in
But under a functional liability regime,
organizational injustice.
Workforce's legal responsibility should be clear to all parties involved
including Regina. This would result in less distributive organizational
injustice.
Besides being important to employees' sense of psychological wellbeing, organizational justice should be important to employers too.
Studies have indicated that organizational justice is related to
counterproductive work behaviors, organizational commitment, the
likelihood that an employee will quit, and organizational citizenship
behavior.2 73
CONCLUSION

While commentators have recognized the loyal matchmaker
dilemma identified in this paper, none have meaningfully and critically
analyzed the dilemma under a functional conception of the employer.
Decision-makers apply current employer responsibility principles in a
269.

STEPHEN W. GILLILAND & DAVID CHAN , Justice in Organizations: Theory,

Methods, and Applications, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL, WORK AND ORGANIZATIONAL

PSYCHOLOGY 143, 144-46 (Neil Anderson et al. eds., 2001).
270. Id at 144-45, 146.
271. See id. at 145.
272. See Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691.
273. Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, The Role ofJustice in Organizations:A MetaAnalysis, 86 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 278, 304-07 (2001).

Organizational

commitment may be particularly important to staffing firms. Some have suggested that temporary
employment, by its very nature, negatively affects a temporary employee's organizational
commitment. See, e.g., Robert W.D. Veitch & Helena D. Cooper-Thomas, Tit for Tat? Predictors
of Temporary Agency Workers' Commitments, 47 ASIA PAC. J. HUM. RES. 318, 319-20 (2009)
(summarizing theoretical research on organizational commitment in temporary employment).
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rigid way, and fail to account for the complex, multi-lateral relationship
inherent in the staffing agency context.
- As I have shown, the functional liability standard I have proposed is
preferable because it is flexible enough to account for certain instances
where strict liability is more justified. It is also consistent with the
employee's expectations, and such consistency allows for an employee
to perceive more organizational justice. The functional standard is also
predictable-the temp agency will be liable for every employer function
it engages in. To be fair to the staffing firm, given the standard's
penchant for strict liability, the staffing firm is entitled to an affirmative
defense. The staffing firm can satisfy the affirmative defense through
reasonable accommodation, like the reasonable accommodation mandate
found in the ADA 2 7 4 or religious accommodation under Title VII.275
With the rise of temporary staffing firms comes new challenges to
employment discrimination law. The loyal matchmaker dilemma is one
such challenge, and it must be met with a flexible, predictable, and
consistent liability standard that is not only fairer to staffing firms, but
also fairer to their temporary employees. This Article's proposal, I hope,
meets that challenge.

274.
275.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2012).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
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